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Abstract
This paper reviews results of a survey of rail infrastructure charges in Europe, presenting
evidence on the structure and level of charges across 23 countries, and on the rationale
behind the charges. A wide variety of both structure and level of charges is found, and it
appears there is a range of explanations for this, including diﬀerences in the nature and
mix of rail traﬃc, diﬀerences in the willingness and ability of governments to provide
subsidies, and continued lack of consensus on the measurement of the marginal cost of
infrastructure use. Recommendations on a sensible structure for rail infrastructure
charges are given, although the need for further research is also acknowledged. The
diversity of approach poses problems particularly for international rail freight, and there
is a strong argument for the development of a speciﬁc set of international rail freight tariﬀs.
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1.0 Introduction
In Europe, since World War Two, it has been normal for rail services to be
provided by a single vertically integrated state owned company. However,
rail has continuously lost market share and required steadily increasing
subsidies over this period. Moreover, the view is widely held that it has
particularly failed to exploit the growing opportunities for long-distance
international freight, where the traditional approach of each national rail
company handing traﬃc over to its neighbour at the border has failed to
provide the kind of door-to-door quality of service provided by road.
Beginning in 1991 with Directive 91/440, the European Commission has
pursued a policy of seeking to introduce competition for the provision of
rail services and to achieve new entry by companies that would oﬀer
door-to-door service across Europe.
Directive 91/440 introduced the right of access to the infrastructure
for limited categories of international freight operators, but that right has
been extended to all international rail freight operators on an extensive
trans-European rail freight network and by 2007 will apply to all freight,
domestic and international, on the entire European Union rail network.
Extending the right also to international passenger services is now under
discussion. At the same time, a number of countries have introduced com-
petition in the form of competitive tendering for the provision of passenger
services under a franchise arrangement. That applies to virtually all
passenger services in Great Britain, but also to many services in Sweden
and Germany, to some in Denmark and the Netherlands, and to a single
route in Portugal.
Simply bestowing rights of access was not, however, suﬃcient to achieve
competition, particularly in the face of strong opposition to open access in
some countries. Directives also had to be introduced to cover licensing and
safety arrangements (clearly it is essential to restrict access to operators
who can satisfy the relevant authorities that they will operate safely, but
at the same time it is necessary to guard against this being used as an
excuse to prevent entry for protectionist reasons). It was necessary to put
in place arrangements to ensure that the allocation of slots was not used
as a way to disadvantage new entrants (where the infrastructure manager
also provides train services, slot allocation must be done by a separate
body, and train operators have the right of appeal to an independent
regulator). Last but not least it was necessary to introduce legislation on
the subject of infrastructure charges to prevent these from being used as
a deliberate barrier to entry.
In the following section we consider the principles behind rail infra-
structure charges, and the way in which these are embodied in current
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legislation. We then discuss the measurement of the relevant costs before
turning to actual practice as it is at present in Europe. Finally we seek to
draw conclusions.
2.0 Principles
It has long been recognised that infrastructure charges may be set with a
variety of objectives in mind and that these objectives may conﬂict.
Giving appropriate incentives to the train operator to make the best use
of existing track capacity means charging short-run marginal social cost,
including external eﬀects not just on the rest of society (for example environ-
mental cost) but also on other train operators through additional delays or
through making it impossible for them to get the slots they wish. From the
point of view of the longer-term development of services it is also important
to provide the train operator (or funder of the services, where they are sub-
sidised) with appropriate signals as to the long-run cost of that pattern of
service, allowing for the possibility of investment or disinvestment, and to
provide signals to the infrastructure manager to undertake such investment
or disinvestment (this may be considered less important if the infrastructure
manager is under direct government control and required to undertake such
decisions on the basis of cost-beneﬁt analysis than if it is a private company
reacting solely to ﬁnancial incentives).
Already, therefore, there is a conﬂict between charging short-run
marginal cost and charging the long-run incremental cost of the set of
services in question. An obvious solution to this is to charge a variable
charge equal to the short-run marginal cost of the particular train, and a
ﬁxed charge equal to the avoidable cost of the set of services as a whole.
The ﬁxed charge would be open to renegotiation as part of a long-term
access agreement specifying broad access rights, whereas the variable
charge would be based on the service actually run in the timetable period
in question. Spare slots could be sold on the spot market on the basis of
short-run marginal cost but would imply no longer-term access rights.
This is straightforward when there is a single operator, but more
complex when diﬀerent operators share a route. Two factors lead to
great diﬃculties with such calculations in the rail sector:
. the lack of a single clear cut measure of capacity;
. the importance of sunk costs andof indivisibilities and economies of scale.
On the ﬁrst point, consider the eﬀect of adding additional tracks to a main
line shared by operators of fast and stopping passenger services and freight.
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How many paths it would create depends heavily on the mix of trains in
question. If it was used to transfer all freight and stopping passenger
trains from the fast lines, it might create a large number of paths per
hour for fast trains. If it was exclusively freight, it might create a somewhat
smaller number of freight paths per hour. On the second point the number
of paths actually demanded may well be less than those created, particu-
larly away from peak times, and part of the cost of providing this capacity
is a sunk cost of preparing the track bed and structures that cannot be
recovered if the tracks are abandoned.
The result of all this is that it is impossible to come up with a single
long-run marginal cost per path; the cost per path of the services of one
operator will vary according to what else is running on the system.
What can be calculated is the incremental cost of providing capacity for
the services of each operator given what else is running. This will probably
leave an element of the capacity cost that is truly joint between them, and
which must be recovered in the most eﬃcient way possible. Unless the
government in question chooses to fund this directly, this is likely to be
by an increase in the ﬁxed part of the tariﬀ to the operator most able to
bear it.
In 1995 the Commission published a Green Paper entitled ‘Towards
Fair and Eﬃcient Pricing in Transport’ (Commission of the European
Communities, 1995), which broadly espoused the marginal social cost pri-
cing principle, while recognising that there was a conﬂict between this and
recovering the full cost of infrastructure provision. This led to a White
Paper in 1998, in which the Commission published its proposals for the
introduction of a common transport infrastructure charging framework,
which placed a further emphasis on the marginal social cost pricing
approach, while allowing non-discriminatory ﬁxed charges to be levied
where this is not adequate for full cost recovery (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 1998). Detailed proposals on railway infrastructure
charging emerged in Directive 2001/14, on allocation of railway infrastruc-
ture capacity and levying of charges. In summary, the directive determines
that charges must be based on ‘costs directly incurred as a result of
operating the train service’. They may include:
. scarcity, although where a section of track is deﬁned as having a scarcity
problem, the infrastructure manager must examine proposals to relieve
that scarcity, and undertake them unless they are shown, on the basis of
cost beneﬁt analysis, not to be worthwhile;
. environmental costs, but only where these are levied on other modes;
. recovery of the costs of speciﬁc investments where these are worthwhile
and could not otherwise be funded;
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. discounts, but only where justiﬁed by costs; large operators may not use
their market power to get discounts;
. reservation charges for scarce capacity, which must be paid whether the
capacity is used or not;
. compensation for unpaid costs on other modes;
. non-discriminatory mark-ups, but these must not exclude segments of
traﬃc which could cover direct cost.
It seems clear from the list of elements that may be included in the
charges that ‘the direct cost of operating the service’ is to be interpreted
as short-run marginal social cost. However, the arguments that this form
of pricing may lead infrastructure managers to restrict capacity artiﬁcially
or to be unable to fund their activities in total or particular investments are
all addressed by special provisions. Moreover, there is allowance for
second-best pricing in the face of distorted prices on other modes.
Of particular concern in the current context are the provisions regarding
non-discriminatory mark-ups. It is clear from the Directive that the discri-
mination referred to here is between diﬀerent operators of the same type of
traﬃc; discrimination by type of traﬃc is allowed. However, the Directive
speciﬁcally states that the average and marginal charges in the tariﬀ should
be close. This seems speciﬁcally to rule out the sort of two-part tariﬀ
discussed above, although in the case of competitive tendering, where
whichever operator wins the franchise would pay the same ﬁxed charge,
there would appear to be no discrimination between operators. Wherever
there is on-track competition, two-part tariﬀs are highly problematic in
terms of meeting the non-discrimination criteria.
The removal of the possibility of two-part tariﬀs makes it impossible
simultaneously to achieve the twin objectives of optimising use of the exist-
ing infrastructure and giving appropriate incentives for development of the
infrastructure. A choice has to be made between short-run and long-run
marginal cost as the basis for pricing. Given the problems already identiﬁed
with measuring long-run marginal cost of rail capacity, short-run marginal
cost pricing seems much more straightforward. If the infrastructure man-
ager can be relied upon to take sensible investment/disinvestment decisions
on the basis of cost beneﬁt analysis, then using pricing to promote eﬃcient
use of the existing infrastructure and ignoring longer-run development
incentives is wholly appropriate. But if a commercial infrastructure man-
ager is combined with on-track competition the problem becomes acute.
Moreover, if it is necessary to recover from operators more than just the
marginal cost of their use of the infrastructure a further problem is
added. It is no longer possible to use ﬁxed charges for this purpose, so
the best that can be done is to vary charges with the price elasticity of
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demand of the market segment in question — Ramsey pricing. But the
knowledge of the infrastructure manager regarding the types of traﬃc
using the system and its price elasticity of demand may be limited to a
few broad categories of train. Certainly the infrastructure manager will
not be as well placed to discriminate between markets as will the train
operator, who deals directly with individual ﬁnal customers. Thus
Ramsey pricing of track access is likely to be more distorting than use of
a two-part tariﬀ.
Our discussion of principles has the clear implication that there is no
single set of infrastructure charging principles that will be optimal in all
circumstances. If the government is willing to fund a large part of infra-
structure costs, and takes infrastructure development decisions on the
basis of cost beneﬁt analysis, then ‘pure’ short-run marginal social cost
pricing may be the best solution. Where there is a monopoly operator,
for instance as a result of a franchise competition, two-part tariﬀs will be
best. Where there is on-track competition, but government funding is
limited, marginal cost pricing with mark-ups will be needed. If there is
on-track competition on track owned by a private company, then
infrastructure pricing is particularly diﬃcult unless the market is suﬃ-
ciently insensitive to price that simple average cost pricing is not too
distorting.
3.0 Empirical Measurement of Costs
The previous section implies that in most circumstances, measurement of
short-run marginal social cost will be an essential element in producing
an eﬃcient infrastructure charging system. Thus we need to move from
principles to measurement. However, there seems to be little agreement
currently on what cost elements should enter into short-run marginal
social cost and how they should be measured.
In this section we consider the main elements of marginal cost and the
way in which they are currently treated in charging systems. Table 1 sum-
marises the cost elements that enter directly into charging systems of the
diﬀerent countries. Broadly they may be summarised as follows.
3.1 Maintenance and renewals
It is generally accepted that while some elements of trackmaintenance— for
example weedkilling — are needed regardless of traﬃc levels, others — for
example ballast cleaning — are inﬂuenced by the volume and nature of
traﬃc. Moreover, the same applied to renewals. While deterioration of
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sleepers and ballast may occur over time regardless of use, this process may
be accelerated by traﬃc passing over them, and rail wear will be almost
entirely due to the traﬃc passing over it.
Maintenance and renewals costs are generally considered to be the main
elements of marginal cost to the infrastructure manager and are the only
ones for which published econometric evidence exists. Econometric studies
of the marginal cost of track maintenance and renewals in European con-
ditions (Thomas, 2002) generally show these to amount to between 10 and
30 per cent of average maintenance and renewals cost. However, most of
these studies only consider maintenance cost. Because renewals tend to
be bunched, and to depend on traﬃc levels over a number of previous
years, it is much harder to get evidence on the marginal cost of traﬃc in
terms of renewals. In fact, of the econometric studies referred to above,
only that for Finland covers both maintenance and renewals. Elsewhere,
given the absence of evidence, renewals are often ignored when it comes
to the measurement of marginal social cost.
Most econometric studies use gross tonne kilometres as the measure of
traﬃc volumes and do not distinguish between types of trains. Where there
is such a distinction in the measurement of marginal cost, it is generally —
as in Britain — based on engineering formulae. For instance, in Britain rail
wear is taken to depend on equivalent gross tonne miles (EGTM ) computed
Table 1
Cost Elements Entering into Variable Charges
Maintenance Renewals
Train Planning
and Operations
Congestion
and Scarcity Accidents Environment
Austria X   X  
Czech X  X   
Denmark X   X  
Estonia X X X   
Finland X X    X
France X X X X  
Germany X X X X  
Hungary X X X   
Italy   X X  
Latvia X X X   
Netherlands X  X   
Poland X X X   
Portugal X  X   
Romania X  X   
Slovenia X X X   
Sweden X    X X
Switzerland X X X X  noise bonus
UK X X  X  
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by the following formula:
EGTM ¼ K Ct A
0:49
S
0:64
USM
0:19
GTM;
where K ¼ constant, Ct ¼ unit type constant, A ¼ axle load, S ¼ speed,
and USM ¼ unsprung mass.
To obtain its estimate of the general level of marginal cost of mainte-
nance and renewals Britain takes a rather traditional approach of dividing
costs into ﬁxed and variable based on engineering evidence (Table 2) and
uses average variable cost as an approximation of marginal cost of mainte-
nance and renewals, but it is important to realise that this is in the context
of a deﬁnition of variable costs that include only those costs thought to vary
with output in the vicinity of current output levels; it gives a cost elasticity
not greatly out of line with econometric evidence for other countries and
appears to be a reasonable approximation to marginal cost.
3.2 Train planning and operations
There is no such common view on the variability of train planning and
operations. While it must surely be the case that staﬀ and facilities required
for train planning vary with the volume and complexity of train movements
to be planned, it may be that there are such indivisibilities that the marginal
cost of additional paths is negligible. Similarly with modern signalling sys-
tems the costs of signalling and train control largely take the form of capital
investment rather than labour and therefore vary little in the short run.
3.3 Power
Where the infrastructure manager is responsible for supplying electricity,
this should be largely a case of passing on the cost. However, there will
Table 2
Classification of Fixed and Variable Costs in Great Britain
Asset Activity Component % Variable
Track Maintenance 30
Renewal Rail 95
Sleepers 25
Ballast 30
Structures Maintenance & Renewal 10
Signalling Maintenance 5
Renewal 0
Electriﬁcation Maintenance 10
Renewal AC 35
DC 41
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be marginal wear and tear costs on the catenary, which might be treated as
an add-on to the electricity charge, or as an element of maintenance and
renewals cost, obviously charged only to electric traction.
3.4 Other services
Under EU law infrastructure managers are required to oﬀer a basic pack-
age and are then allowed to charge for additional services. Such services
may include use of stations, depots, marshalling facilities and the provision
of information. It seems likely that in most cases the marginal cost of use of
such facilities (except where the infrastructure manager provides direct
labour inputs) is close to zero but there is no research to follow.
3.5 Congestion and scarcity
Congestion arises where one train delays another. In a planned system such
as a railway the timetable is designed to prevent this from happening, but
it remains the case that at high levels of utilisation, the presence of an
additional train on the tracks may lead to additional delays to other
trains by reducing the ability of the system to recover from delays.
Congestion charges should be distinguished from the costs of delays
imposed by the infrastructure manager or by one train operator on another.
Where these are charged for, they are part of a separate performance
regime. Such regimes already exist in Great Britain and Finland, and
other countries are examining them.
Scarcity costs arise where the presence of a train prevents another train
from operating, or requires it to take an inferior path, while congestion
costs only arise when a train actually operates; scarcity costs are incurred
whenever a path is reserved for its use. Thus there is a case for the latter
to be charged for by means of a reservation fee, but which would only
apply where capacity was tight. Obviously both forms of charge should
be diﬀerentiated in time and space according to the level of capacity utilisa-
tion, and according to the capacity the train itself requires, which depends
upon how its speed relates to those of other trains.
3.6 Environmental costs
The main elements of marginal environmental costs are noise, local air
pollution and global warming. While global warming depends entirely on
consumption of carbon based fuels either directly or in the form of electri-
city (and therefore for those countries in which electricity is largely hydro or
nuclear based will be very small), noise and local air pollution eﬀects
depend on the characteristics both of the rolling stock and of the locality
through which it is passing (in particular population density but also
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factors such as wind speed and direction). European research projects have
produced estimates of these costs for a variety of circumstances (UNITE,
2004). Obviously it is not usually desirable for these charges to be paid
direct to the infrastructure manager if there is any risk of creating perverse
incentives to attract environmentally damaging trains to boost income.
3.7 Accident costs
For the most part, train operating companies are responsible for the acci-
dent costs they cause, either by bearing them directly or through insurance.
However, there are arguments that if running additional trains raises the
accident risk either for other trains or for road vehicles at level crossings
then there is a diﬀerence between marginal external cost imposed on
third parties and average cost borne by the user. There is some evidence
on this for Sweden (UNITE 2004). It may also be the case that some
costs are borne by the state or by those involved in accidents and not
fully compensated by the rail operator.
4.0 The Structure of Charges
Table 3 illustrates the structure of charges for the majority of European
countries. It will be seen that the most common system is a simple charge
per train kilometre, which may be diﬀerentiated by type of traction,
weight, speed, and axleload of the train. This may be a reasonable way
of charging for maintenance and renewals costs, environmental costs,
and congestion, although as noted above the ﬁrst two of these items may
vary reasonably closely with gross tonne kilometres. Some countries
(such as Finland) only charge per gross tonne kilometre, whilst others
(such as Austria) combine gross tonne kilometre charges for wear and
tear with charges per train kilometre for other cost elements.
There is a greater diversity of views on the marginal cost of train
planning and operations, some countries (such as Finland and implicitly
Great Britain) regarding it as totally ﬁxed. Where it is regarded as part
of marginal cost, it seems appropriate to charge per planned path (as in
Hungary and Italy), with some adjustment according to the complexity
of the task of planning the path. The latter may relate to the distance the
train travels (so a charge per path-km is another possibility), the number
of connections that need to be planned, or the number of congested
nodes it needs to be ﬁtted through. Switzerland levies a charge per train-
km for train planning and operations; both Switzerland and Italy also
have a charge per node, although this may be purely a congestion charge.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 39, Part 3
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Table 3
Structure of Charges
Pricing Principle Fixed Charges
Charges per
Gross Tonne-km Train-km Path-km Other
Austria MCþ X X
Bulgaria MCþ X
Czech Republic MCþ X X
Denmark MCþ X Charges per train for bottlenecks and bridges
Estonia FC X X X
Finland MCþ X
France MCþ X X X
Germany FC X
Hungary FC X X
Italy FC (Traﬃc
management only)
X X X Also charge per node
Latvia FC X
Netherlands MC X
Poland FC X X
Portugal MC X
Romania FC X X X
Slovenia FC X
Sweden MCþ X Øresund bridge surcharge
Switzerland MCþ X X Also charge per node
UK MCþ Franchisees only X Per vehicle km by type of vehicle
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Slovenia is proposing an additional charge for use of lines outside the
normal hours of operation. The charge per train-km in Germany varies
as to whether the path sought is express, regular interval, or economy.
Switzerland has a surcharge for dangerous goods.
France has a tariﬀ incorporating a monthly track access charge that is
designed to recover the costs of train planning. This is diﬀerentiated accord-
ing to the number of paths requested, increasing much less rapidly than the
number of paths. Although this charge only accounts for 4 per cent of
current revenues from infrastructure charges as a whole, and thus 4 per
cent of the charges paid by SNCF, it could amount to a very much more
signiﬁcant element of costs for a small operator, since the cost per path is
ten times higher for a small number of train paths. The charge is to be
modiﬁed from the beginning of 2006 to eliminate the bias against small
operators.
Only Great Britain has a congestion charge per train-km explicitly
related to estimates of congestion costs. However, charges per train-km
in Italy and Germany vary by train speed and type of route. In Germany
there is an explicit utilisation factor, with a higher charge for heavily
used lines. Italy uses a simple approach of setting standard speed proﬁles
for each route designed to optimise the line, and charging higher prices
for paths that deviate from the proﬁle, either by seeking faster or slower
paths that disrupt the optimal service proﬁle. Slovenia is proposing an
oﬀ-peak discount. There is also a charge per node in Switzerland and
Italy that varies with the implicit amount of congestion at the node by
categorising nodes according to traﬃc levels.
As noted above, when charging for scarcity it is appropriate to levy a
reservation charge, regardless of whether the reserved path is used or
not. France has such a charge. Switzerland has a train path cancellation
charge. This seems a curious way of dealing with the issue, as it is likely
to hamper rather than help the reallocation of paths to higher value uses.
Germany (and the proposals for Slovenia) charges more for ad hoc paths
than for regular paths, which is the opposite of a reservation fee, but
may be justiﬁed in terms of costs of train planning.
In addition to the basic track access charges, some systems have charges
for the use of stations, depots and marshalling yards, or for other supple-
mentary services (for instance there is a passenger information surcharge
on passenger train gross tonne-km in Sweden). It appears that typically
these charges are based on average rather than marginal cost and, although
in most cases they do not appear to be a large part of the total charge, it is
possible that they both distort traﬃc levels and discourage entry, particu-
larly where the charge is for use of a facility that the incumbent operator
provides. A few countries have emissions charges levied on diesel fuel for
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rail traction and paid direct to the government (examples are Finland,
Norway, Sweden). Obviously these charges do not vary in time and space,
and are therefore only strictly appropriate for reﬂecting costs such as global
warming, rather than local air pollution costs, which do vary with these
factors. There is a charge for accident costs in the Swedish system.
5.0 The Level of Charges
Figure 1 illustrates typical levels of charge for passenger and freight trains
per train kilometre. It will be seen that these vary from less than one euro
per train kilometre in Scandinavia to charges of ﬁve or six euros per train
kilometre for freight in Eastern Europe (and considerably more than that
in the case of Slovakia). While some of the diﬀerence may be due to genuine
diﬀerences in cost as a result of ground conditions, wage levels and types of
traﬃc (for instance the average weight of trains) it is likely that much of the
diﬀerence is due to diﬀerences in the degree to which governments are
willing and able to bear a large part of the costs of the infrastructure.
Thus Scandinavian countries aim at genuine short-run marginal cost
pricing (and may actually charge below marginal cost because of the failure
to charge for marginal renewals cost) while many Central and Eastern
European countries aim at full cost recovery because of a simple shortage
of government resources.
Figure 1
Typical levels of charges
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Three countries, Britain, France, and Germany, stand out as having
high charges for passenger trains. In Britain and France this is achieved
via a two-part tariﬀ in a sector where there is little or no on-track competi-
tion. Germany aims at a high level of cost recovery, recovering all costs
except for some capital costs from users, but abandoned two-part tariﬀs
in the face of objections from competitors. Freight tariﬀs are high in the
former communist countries of the CEE. In the Baltic states, where most
of the freight traﬃc is completing a long haul between Russia and the
ports, the high tariﬀs may not have a serious eﬀect on traﬃc. Elsewhere,
there is a serious danger that in many cases these tariﬀs are set to achieve
full cost recovery without consideration of the competitive position of
rail freight, and without adequate examination of unpopular options
such as rationalisation to reduce costs (CER, 2004).
Mark-ups come essentially in two forms: ﬁxed charges as part of a two-
part tariﬀ, and mark-ups on variable charges. The latter will be a charge per
train-km (or vehicle or gross tonne-km) varying with the nature of the
traﬃc the train carries.
Britain, Italy, France, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania
have two-part tariﬀs. Where the ‘ﬁxed’ part of the tariﬀ is in fact a
charge per path or per path-km, it may of course simply reﬂect marginal
costs of train planning or of scarcity, and a mark-up applied to this is
similar to a mark-up per train-km. A true ﬁxed charge will be a lump
sum for access to the infrastructure (possibly related to the route length
accessed, as with the two-part tariﬀ that used to exist in Germany).
Fixed charges are attractive inasmuch as they permit mark-ups without
distorting the incentives to train operators regarding the number and types
of trains to run. But unless the ﬁxed element is designed carefully it may
create distortions by preventing some operators from accessing the
system at all and by biasing the terms of competition between large and
small operators.
In Britain, the ﬁxed element is charged only to passenger franchisees,
and covers their avoidable costs (that is, not just variable costs but also
any ﬁxed costs that would be avoided if the particular set of services was
no longer running) plus a share of all remaining joint and ﬁxed costs.
This charge is simply reﬂected in the payment the franchisee receives for
operating the franchise, and therefore there is no need for diﬀerentiation
according to ability to pay at the level of individual trains or train types.
The franchise system allows ﬁxed costs to be passed on in a ﬁxed charge
without any distortion of competition.
Elsewhere (for example in Germany, Switzerland) mark-ups take the
form of variable charges and are generally related to the type of traﬃc.
In some cases (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark) mark-ups are
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used on new routes to contribute to their ﬁnancing costs. It is doubtful
whether mark-ups on speciﬁc routes to help fund capital costs are eﬃcient;
there is no reason to suppose that elasticities are systematically lower on
those routes than elsewhere, although some of these routes involve bridges
where there is a toll on road traﬃc too, and there a mark-up may be feasible
without inter-modal distortion.
One example of incentives created by high mark-ups on new facilities is
the approach in Denmark and Sweden to recovering the cost of the
Øresund Bridge (connecting Denmark and Sweden) and the Storebælt
Bridge (connecting the Danish islands of Zealand and Funen), furnishing
the direct rail connection between Denmark, Sweden and Germany. The
access charge to the Øresund Bridge is a ﬁxed amount per freight train,
€286 on the Danish side and €255 per freight train on the Swedish side, a
total of €541 per freight train (the passenger charge is €210 per train on
the Danish side only). Access charges for the Storebælt Bridge are €873
per freight train and €941 per passenger train. Taking the bridge charges
together, a freight train from Sweden to Germany would pay €1,414: this
is equivalent to almost 6,000 km of train charges at the current Danish
main line access charge (excluding bridge and congestion charges). It
furnishes a powerful incentive to run the longest possible freight trains,
which will reduce bridge charges but at the cost of reduced service
frequency for freight shippers. By comparison, a simple charge per gross
tonne-km would have no eﬀect on the length of freight trains, and would
not aﬀect service levels.
This example is instructive on the eﬀect of charging access charges
well above marginal cost: the high Danish and Swedish tolls, imposed in
order to pay back the debt from building the bridge, clearly must suppress
rail traﬃc across the bridges and aﬀect the structure and service levels
of freight services for the transit traﬃc from Sweden to Germany and
beyond.
Diﬀerences in charges between routes, areas and market segments may
reﬂect diﬀerences in willingness to pay, and therefore raise the necessary
revenue in the least distorting way, although they may also reﬂect other
principles (such as the avoidable costs of the category of traﬃc, or the
route, in question). It should be noted that the number of identiﬁed cate-
gories of train, and therefore the degree of price discrimination, is usually
quite small. The infrastructure manager has much less ability to diﬀerenti-
ate price, for instance between passengers or containers on a given train,
than the train operator. Two-part tariﬀs may therefore distort prices less
than mark-ups on the variable charge for infrastructure use, even when
they require train operators to recover more than marginal costs in the
ﬁnal market.
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There is a particular problem about mark-ups on international traﬃc.
This is the so-called double marginalisation problem (Bassanini and
Pouyet, 2000): if each country puts on a mark-up that is most proﬁtable
relating to its own costs and revenues, the net eﬀect is a much greater
mark-up than if a single operator designed a mark-up that was optimal
for the ﬂow of traﬃc over the route as a whole. This suggests a need for
speciﬁc rules concerning mark-ups on international traﬃc, if indeed they
should be permitted at all. Ideally, if a mark-up is required on international
traﬃc it would be better that it should be negotiated by the infrastructure
managers concerned amongst themselves, rather than simply be the result
of adding domestic tariﬀs together regardless of the competitiveness of
the resulting charge.
One ﬁnal point should bemade regardingmark-ups. There is always a fear
that dominant operators will use their market power to secure favourable
treatment, and this fear is particularly strong where the dominant operator
is part of the same organisation as the infrastructure manager. Straight-
forward discrimination between particular operators is of course illegal
under EU legislation, but it is possible to design mark-ups that favour the
dominant operator, for instance through two-part tariﬀs or by unfavourable
treatment of traﬃc in which the threat of entry is strongest. Similar eﬀects
may be achieved by manipulating the charges for individual services, and
particularly services that the dominant operator provides for itself.
6.0 Policy Implications
Given the wide range of experience outlined above what can be said by way
of general policy conclusions? Some conclusions are straightforward. In
countries where there is little or no competition (such as Finland), conges-
tion and scarcity costs may be irrelevant to the charging system as they
are already internalised to the single operator (who will nevertheless need
to examine their magnitude to make sensible decisions). Moreover, in
Finland, there is little mark-up on marginal social costs in the tariﬀ — the
state pays 86 per cent of infrastructure costs. Thus it is not surprising to
ﬁnd a much simpler tariﬀ in Finland than in, say, Britain or Germany,
both of which have many diﬀerent operators and a requirement to fund a
much higher proportion of infrastructure costs through access charges.
A common approach is to have a charge per train-km along with a
charge per gross tonne-km, diﬀerentiated to a greater or lesser degree by
type of train and type of track. This can be adequately diﬀerentiated to
reﬂect diﬀerences in weight, axle load, speed, and quality of track, and
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thus can appropriately recover marginal maintenance and renewal costs.
Appropriately diﬀerentiated by location, type of traction, and time of
day, it can also reﬂect congestion and external costs. In general charges
that accurately reﬂected short run marginal social cost would need to diﬀer-
entiate train-km charges by time, location, infrastructure characteristics
(higher charges on lower quality track), and rolling stock characteristics
(type of traction, gross weight, axle load and speed).
The only charges that cannot be appropriately represented by a diﬀeren-
tiated charge per train-km and gross tonne-km are those that reﬂect costs
that are incurred whether the train actually runs or not; namely train
planning and, where a slot is reserved for the train, scarcity. For these
costs it seems appropriate to charge per path-km. For scarcity charges,
this would again need to be diﬀerentiated by location, time of day, and
possibly speed relative to the typical speed on the route in question, and
could include a charge per node.
Where mark-ups are needed to boost cost recovery, there is a consider-
able problem. Fixed charges, as long as they reﬂect the ability to pay of the
operator, are least distorting in terms of their incentives regarding train-
kilometres run, but are likely to distort competition between large and
small operators and this is the typical form of competition in Europe.
They are therefore only likely to be acceptable in the case of monopoly
franchises (which support competition for, rather than in the market). Else-
where, the best solution is likely to be a mark-up per train-km and/or gross
tonne-km based on market segment, although it is questionable whether
these should be permitted on international freight trains (or whether
there should be some kind of cap). Surcharges may make sense where
high quality service or market position make this feasible without signiﬁ-
cant loss of traﬃc, but it should not be considered that simply because
expensive new infrastructure is in place, that alone justiﬁes a surcharge
regardless of the eﬀect on the market.
For ancillary services, such as the use of stations or marshalling yards, a
charge per train or per wagon would seem appropriate, but again possibly
diﬀerentiated by market segment, train length, and the length of time the
train or wagon uses the facility if capacity is scarce.
It is clear that marginal social cost based charges could therefore appear
quite complex even if based largely on a diﬀerentiated charge per train-km
or path-km. Towhat extent such complexities are worthwhile in terms of the
impact of the incentives they produce is an empirical question, and there
seems little empirical evidence (the example was quoted in ECMT 2005 of
a charge for open coal wagons for the contamination of ballast by coal
dust leading to the ﬁtting of hoods on wagons as support for very detailed
incentives). It also seems likely that the degree of diﬀerentiation that is
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optimal will depend very much on the characteristics of the network and the
traﬃc using it; the simpler and less congested it is, the less the case for
complicated tariﬀs. However, for international traﬃc, the existence of
very diﬀerent degrees of diﬀerentiation of charges in diﬀerent countries
along the route is certainly a complicating factor. This may support the
idea of separate international tariﬀs, negotiated between or among the infra-
structure managers concerned, at least on key international routes.
7.0 Conclusions
We have seen that there are some diﬃcult issues to resolve in designing a
rail infrastructure charging regime. The ﬁrst is a matter of principle; a
single charge per train kilometre cannot both give the correct incentives
for the optimal use of the existing infrastructure and the right signals for
the future development of the infrastructure through investment or dis-
investment. One solution to this is to charge according to a two-part
tariﬀ, where the variable element reﬂects the short-run marginal social
cost of the use of the existing infrastructure, and the ﬁxed element reﬂects
the avoidable cost of providing the capacity made available to the operator
under a framework agreement. An operator could simply buy capacity on
the spot market at short-run marginal cost but then would gain no longer-
term access rights.
This solution is wholly appropriate in the case of monopoly franchises,
such as are often applied in Europe to passenger services, but is much more
problematic in the case of on-track completion as exists mainly for freight,
as the ﬁxed charge has to be divided between competitors in a non-
discriminatory way. In practice European legislation essentially rules out
two-part tariﬀs in such cases, requiring charges to be based on marginal
social cost plus a mark-up that may diﬀerentiate between market segments
but not between operators.
Despite a great deal of research work, there is still no general agreement
on how actually to measure and calculate rail infrastructure marginal costs
or external costs. There is an urgent need for a common approach to ensure
that at least the basic wear and tear costs, including accelerated renewals,
are recovered from users. Only second-best arguments, based on under-
charging on other modes, could justify failing to do this. Acknowledging
the diﬃculty of measuring marginal cost (including renewals), there are a
number of cases in which the access charge regime almost certainly has
charges below marginal cost, even without renewals. The Swedish access
charge regime only collects a small proportion of its costs from users, an
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amount that falls well below the rule of thumb that the variable costs of
maintenance and renewals are about 10 to 30 per cent of average mainte-
nance and renewals costs. Access charges in Norway and Denmark
(except for the bridge tolls discussed elsewhere) are comparable in level
with Sweden, and must also be below marginal cost when renewals are
taken into account. Norway does not charge for passenger trains at all,
an approach that is by deﬁnition below marginal cost. A number of
countries explicitly do not attempt to recover the cost of renewal in their
access regimes, and have thus consciously or unconsciously chosen not to
charge for the full eﬀects of wear and tear on the track.
There is even less agreement or evidence on how far other cost elements
should enter into marginal social cost. To what extent are train planning
costs, costs of providing stations, depots or marshalling facilities ﬁxed
regardless of use? If there is a true marginal cost of train planning then it
seems likely to depend on the number of paths planned, with perhaps
some allowance for the complexity of the path. Where a charge is levied
for pure congestion eﬀects it should be a charge per train kilometre but
diﬀerentiated in time and space; where for scarcity, it could take the form
of a reservation fee.
Environmental costs will vary with train weight, speed, type of traction,
and location. Where charges do exist to cover such costs they are generally
much simpler charges, for instance related to fuel used. Such charges should
not go to the infrastructure manager in circumstances in which they could
create a perverse incentive to encourage environmentally damaging train
kilometres.
We have found a wide variety of structures and levels of charges in the
various countries of the European Union. There is good reason for diﬀer-
ences in terms of the nature of the traﬃc and the degree of government
support received. However, there is little doubt that the current situation
makes life diﬃcult for operators of international freight, in terms of trans-
parency of charges, in terms of confused incentives (for instance short
frequent trains could be cheapest under one country’s regime and heavy
infrequent trains under its neighbour’s) and above all the level of charges
in one country may be prohibitive in terms of international traﬃc involving
transit of that country.
Thus a greater degree of uniformity would be beneﬁcial. To the extent
that this cannot be achieved, there may be a case for the implementation
of special international tariﬀs, jointly negotiated by all the infrastructure
managers in a particular corridor with reference not just to their costs
but also to market conditions in that corridor as a whole. By applying
mark-ups based on conditions in the corridor as a whole it should be
possible to raise the total amount of revenue achieved by any speciﬁc
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amount of traﬃc, and thus to negotiate a scheme for sharing the revenue
that beneﬁts infrastructure managers in the corridor as a whole, as well
as being beneﬁcial for overall resource allocation.
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